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The paper investigates whether and how performance of regional com-
mercial courts has a⁄ected external credit of Russian enterprises between
1995 and 2002. The results show that more reliable courts lead to higher
bank lending to ￿rms. This occurs predominantly through expansion of
the number of businesses which have access to bank ￿nancing. There is
limited evidence that trade credit also responds to changes in quality of
courts. However, credit from suppliers is considerably less sensitive to
court performance than bank credit.
Court reliability is precisely de￿ned and measured objectively using
appeal rates of lower court decisions. The paper analytically derives
the relationship between reliability of courts, appeal rates and lending to
￿rms, identifying a speci￿c channel through which law enforcement a⁄ects
external ￿nancing. Empirical analysis is based on a new panel dataset
which measures credit at the level of a ￿rm and permits a number of
robustness tests.
￿I would like to thank Tim Besley for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the
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11 Introduction
Bank lending to private ￿rms in Russia averaged 13% of GDP between 1995 and
2002. This is in stark contrast to the rest of the industrialized world: among
G7 countries this ratio was 86% in the same period. Among Russian medium
and large size ￿rms, less than half hold bank loans. For those who do, these
loans amount to 10% of total assets. This is about a third of the proportion
reported by ￿rms in G7 economies1. Given the role of ￿nancial intermediation
in promoting investment and economic growth, it is important to explain such
di⁄erences2.
This paper studies the role of law enforcement in explaining the pattern of
credit received by ￿rms in Russia. The poor state of Russia￿ s judiciary is often
named one of the top reasons for the country￿ s economic problems3. According
to a World Bank survey, only 18% of Russian respondent ￿rms believe that
commercial court system in Russia is consistent and reliable4.
This paper links credit received by Russian ￿rms to quality of commercial
courts in regions where these ￿rms locate. I match data on ￿rm-level credit
received by approximately 20,000 large and medium size enterprises with sta-
tistics on performance of 81 regional commercial courts for eight consecutive
years, from 1995 to 2002.
Less than half of ￿rms in the sample receive bank loans, but almost all the
￿rms have trade credit. During the sample period, which includes the 1998
￿nancial crisis, the share of ￿rms with access to either type of credit declined.
At the same time, the amount of credit received by enterprises who continue
to have access to it increased. Behind these aggregate trends lie substantial
di⁄erences in external ￿nancing of ￿rms located in di⁄erent regions of Russia,
which, this study argues, can in part be explained by di⁄erent performance of
commercial courts in these regions.
I develop an analytical framework to analyze how courts may a⁄ect lending
decisions. It is based on the premise that, if there is a dispute between a lender
and a ￿rm, litigation is more costly than an out-of-court settlement. The
model then shows that lender￿ s costs of contract enforcement increase when
lower courts are less reliable predictors of higher courts decisions5. I also show
that the rate of appeal of lower court decisions rises when the lower court is less
reliable. This allows me to use the rate of appeal of lower court decisions as a
1See IMF International Financial Statistics, Rajan and Zingales (1995) on external ￿nanc-
ing in G7 countries, and Huang et al (2002) on Russia￿ s bank credit.
2For links between ￿nancial markets and economic growth, see Levine (1997) and Rajan
and Zingales (1998).
3For instance, Black et al (2000) who argue that lack of ￿ decent legal and enforcement
infrastructure￿was largely responsible for the many failures of Russian privatisation. See also
Gray and Hendley (1997) for case study analysis, Biletsky et al (2002), Frye and Zhuravskaya
(2000) and Frye (2004) for surveys of ￿rms.
4See World Bank (2000). The number includes ￿rms that reported that courts are ￿ fre-
quently￿ , ￿ mostly￿and ￿ always￿consistent and reliable. The rest of the ￿rms chose ￿ sometimes￿ ,
￿ seldom￿or ￿ never￿ . These results put Russia in the 22nd place among 80 countries surveyed.
5Subsequently, I call the court system less predictable, when its lower courts are less reliable
predictors of higher court decisions.
2proxy for court reliability in my empirical estimations.
My empirical results show that when commercial courts are more reliable,
banks lend more to ￿rms located in these courts￿jurisdictions. First, I ￿nd that
improvements in reliability of commercial courts increase the number of ￿rms
to which banks are willing to lend. Second, the amount of bank credit received
by ￿rms also rises with court reliability. The results also show that the latter
e⁄ect is signi￿cantly smaller and potentially less robust than the former. Court
performance also in￿ uences trade credit, but this e⁄ect is notably smaller in
magnitude and the inference is less robust. Improvements in court performance
are not found to increase credit received by ￿rms from other enterprises with
whom they have ownership links.
This evidence in this study lends new support to the view that legal en-
vironment is important for economic and ￿nancial development. Among the
￿rst studies to show a positive relationship between rule of law and countries￿
growth rates were Keefer and Knack (1995) and Mauro (1995). Yet, causality
between quality of law enforcement and development proved notoriously di¢ -
cult to establish: a positive relationship may be observed, for instance, because
more advanced economies are able to build more reliable court systems. La
Porta et al (1997) re￿ne this approach by looking separately at various aspects
of law on books on the one hand, and quality of law enforcement on the other,
and linking them to external ￿nancing. In their 1998 paper, they show that
a relationship exists between legal origin, law on books and concentration of
ownership. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also show a positive rela-
tionship between the rule of law and the use of external ￿nancing in di⁄erent
countries.
Pistor et al (2000) focus on external ￿nance in transition economies. Their
results again point at the existence of a strong link between law and ￿nance:
for example, they show that improving legal environment from Russia￿ s level
to that of Poland increases market capitalization by 20% and private credit by
25%. They ￿nd that law enforcement has a larger impact on external ￿nance
than law on the books. Turning to trade credit in transition countries, survey
evidence by Johnson et al (1999) shows that ￿rms who have more con￿dence in
courts are more willing to extend credit to customers. This e⁄ect is weaker for
those suppliers that have had a relationship with a customer for some time.
In cross-country studies, identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of law enforcement is
usually hindered by di¢ culty of controlling for country characteristics. Sub-
national studies help improve identi￿cation: Chemin (2004) compares the speed
of courts across Indian states and shows that in states with faster courts ￿rms
have more external ￿nancing and undertake more speci￿c investment. Within
￿ve Eastern European countries, Johnson et al (2002) show that ￿rms who
report that courts perform better are also more likely to invest, although they
are no more likely to receive bank ￿nancing than other ￿rms.
In this study, both time and cross-regional variation in court quality is uti-
lized. Much of the policy and macroeconomic environment is common across
Russia￿ s regions, making it easier to separate the e⁄ect of law enforcement from
other factors. Credibility of the results is improved by using an objective mea-
3sure of reliability of courts. The study also establishes a speci￿c mechanism
through which reliability and predictability of the court system a⁄ects the will-
ingness of banks to extend credit.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I develop an analytical
framework to show how reliability and predictability of the court system a⁄ects
lending decisions. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 develops an empirical
model and reports results of the estimations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Analytical framework
This section develops a simple model to understand how law enforcement by
courts may a⁄ect lending to ￿rms. The is based on a premise that, if a dispute
arises, litigation is a more costly option than a settlement. I de￿ne the reliability
of a (lower level) court as the extent to which its decision reduces uncertainty
about what is lawful, and in particular, what a higher court would consider
lawful in the case at hand. I refer to a court system as more predictable when
the reliability of the lower courts is higher. The model shows that the expected
contract enforcement costs of lenders fall when courts are more reliable.
First, I show that when lower courts are less reliable, lenders are more likely
to litigate rather than settle their disputes with borrowers. This raises the
expected costs of contract enforcement for lenders and therefore discourages
credit. Lenders who face a higher probability of a default on a loan are more
a⁄ected by reliability of courts.
Second, the model demonstrates that lower court reliability leads to a higher
probability that a court￿ s decision is appealed. This allows me to use the rate
of appeals as a proxy for otherwise unobserved reliability of the lower court in
subsequent empirical estimation.
Finally, the developed framework shows which other factors may impact both
the rate of appeal and bank lending, and how. These ￿ndings help interpret
the results in section 4.
2.1 Set up
To help follow the model, appendix A lays out its timing.
Consider a bank that decides whether to extend a loan of amount L to a
￿rm. For simplicity set the bank￿ s costs of loanable funds to zero.
With some probability d the bank expects the ￿rm to default on the loan.
If default occurs, the bank threatens to sue the ￿rm in the lower court, and
then in the court of appeals, if necessary. Suppose that the bank knows with
certainty that it will win in the court of appeals.
The ￿rm faces uncertainty and attaches probability ￿ to the bank winning
the appeal. Although ￿ is not observable to the bank; it is known to be
uniformly distributed on a [0;1] interval6. The ￿rm makes an o⁄er of an out-
6If there is no uncertainty about the decision of the appellate court, then all disputes are
settled out of court when litigation is costly. Here, I assume that the bank does not face any
4of-court settlement to the bank. Assume a Nash bargaining solution with the
bank keeping ￿ share of surplus generated by the settlement. Let s denote the
total amount that the bank keeps in case of a settlement. Let ￿ denote the
probability that out-of-court bargaining between the ￿rm and the bank breaks
down, and the case goes to the lower court7. Let c be the costs of litigating in
lower court, borne by each party:
Assume that the lower court makes a decision in favour of the bank with
probability ￿. In other words, ￿ captures the frequency with which the lower
court correctly anticipates the decision of the court of appeal.
After the lower court decision, the party that lost in the lower court threatens
the other with appeal. The ￿rm updates its expectations and arrives at ￿; a
posterior probability that the bank will win the appeal: The ￿rm and the bank
then bargain over a settlement to avoid appeal. Let S denote the amount
received by the bank if they settle. Again I use the Nash bargaining solution
here. If bargaining breaks down, the dispute goes to the court of appeals. Let
￿ denote the probability that the case goes to appeal given that it has been
litigated in the lower court. Let C be the costs of litigating in appellate court
for each side:
2.2 Analysis
At time t = 0 the bank decides whether to extend a loan. It has the following
expected pro￿t function
￿ = (1 ￿ d)L + d[(1 ￿ ￿)s + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)S + ￿(L ￿ C) ￿ c]]: (1)
At t = 1, the ￿rm defaults on the loan with probability d: If default occurs, the
bank threatens with litigation. Since litigation is costly, it is e¢ cient to settle
out of court. The ￿rm makes an o⁄er of a settlement to the bank.
The ￿rm and the bank will settle as long as the minimum settlement that
the bank asks for does not exceed the maximum expected loss from litigation
for the ￿rm
L ￿ c ￿ C < ￿L + c + C8: (2)
This inequality holds with probability







uncertainty for simplicity. Relaxing this assumption does not a⁄ect the results.
7The idea of out of court bargaining in presence of uncertainty over potential court decision
is due to Priest and Klein (1984).
8At t = 1, prior to the lower court decision, the ￿rm expects to go all the way to appeal if
litigation occurs. Thus, the maximum amount it is prepared to o⁄er to settle at t = 1 is its
expected loss from litigating in both courts, i.e. ￿L + c + C:
At t = 1 the bank, knowing the distribution of ￿; the value of ￿ and the fact that he will win
at appeal, can calculate the probability of settlement at t = 3: Thus, the bank￿ s minimum
accepted settlement at t = 1 is somewhat greater than L ￿ c ￿ C; but for simplicity I ignore
this secondary e⁄ect.
5If the settlement occurs, the bank receives
s = L + ￿[(E(￿ j ￿ <
2(c + C)
L
￿ 1)L + 2(C + c)]; (4)
where E(￿ j ￿ > 1 ￿ 2(c + C)=L) = 1 ￿ (c + C)=L and E(:) is the expectations
operator:
If agreement on a settlement is not reached, at t = 2 the bank and the
￿rm litigate in the lower court. The latter decides in favour of the bank with
probability ￿.
At t = 3; the ￿rm updates its estimated probability of the bank winning the
appeal using new information contained in the lower court￿ s decision. Using






￿￿+(1￿￿)(1￿￿) if the bank wins in the court of ￿rst instance
1￿(1￿￿)￿
(1￿￿)￿+￿(1￿￿) if the bank looses
: (5)
The ￿rm updates more, i.e. its posterior ￿ is further away from ￿; when
the lower court decision contains more information about what will happen at
appeal. More precisely, ￿ is further away from ￿ when ￿ is further away from
1=2.9. Thus, the lower court decisions reduce uncertainty more when j￿ ￿ 1=2j
is higher. To use the de￿nition introduced in the beginning of section 2, the
lower court is a more reliable predictor of appellate court￿ s judgements when
j￿ ￿ 1=2j is higher10.
The ￿rm and the bank then bargain over a settlement S to be received by
the bank if appeal is to be avoided. Settlement occurs as long as
￿ > 1 ￿ 2C=L: (6)
The probability of a settlement given that dispute had been litigated in the
lower court is given by






￿ = (1 ￿ 2C
L )(1 ￿ ￿)=f(1 ￿ 2C
L )(1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿g:
Proposition 1
The probability of appeal to a higher court, ￿, falls with reliability of lower
court decisions, j￿ ￿ 1=2j:
9The ￿rm makes no updating at all when ￿ = 1=2.
10If I assume that lower court￿ s decisions are more consistent with appellate court￿ s view
than random guesses, (￿ > 1=2); then ￿ captures reliability of lower court decisions.
6The proof of proposition 1 is in appendix B. The intuition is the following:
when the lower court is more reliable, the ￿rm￿ s estimated probability of the
bank winning the appeal increases more (i.e. moves closer to the true value of
1). Consequently, the ￿rm o⁄ers more to the bank to settle the dispute out of
court. This reduces the ex ante probability of appeal for any initial value of ￿:
If dispute is settled, the bank receives a settlement
S = L ￿ C + ￿[(E(￿j￿ < 1 ￿ 2(c + C)=L;￿ > 1 ￿ 2C=L) ￿ 1)L + 2C]: (8)
If, on the other hand, the bargaining at t = 3 breaks down, the two parties go
on to litigate in the court of appeals, which returns a verdict in favour of the
bank. Substituting results in (7) and (8), we can express the bank￿ s pro￿t in
terms of exogenous variables. This gives rise to the following:
Proposition 2
Lender￿ s expected costs fall with court reliability, j￿ ￿ 1=2j:
The proof of Proposition 2 is in appendix C. This proposition contains the
basic insight into how reliability of court decisions a⁄ects lending. When the
lower court is more reliable, the ￿rm receives more information from its decision
about the would-be outcome of the case at appeal. When the ￿rm better
anticipates the decision of the appellate court, it is willing to o⁄er more to the
bank in a settlement, and the litigation at appeal is less likely. Since litigation
is costly, this lowers the expected costs of enforcing the loan contract for the
lender, and, therefore, makes the lender more likely to extend the loan.11.
The impact of court reliability on the bank￿ s costs, and, therefore, lending, is
larger when the probability of a default is larger. This implies that lenders that
have access to better selection or monitoring technology will be less in￿ uenced
by the quality of courts in their lending decisions.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide motivation for the empirical analysis of section
4. In practice j￿￿1=2j is not directly observable. It a⁄ects lending by reducing
the probability of litigation in the appellate court. Therefore, the impact of
court reliability on lending decisions can be empirically identi￿ed by estimating
the relationship between loans extended and the probability of appeal.
The framework above also identi￿es three other factors that a⁄ect both the
probability of appeal and the lender￿ s expected pro￿ts12. First, the size of loan
L in￿ uences the probability of appeal. The sign of the e⁄ect of L on ￿ depends
on the values of other variables (￿, c and C).
Second, both the probability of appeal and expected pro￿ts of the lender
are a⁄ected by how good the ￿rm is at estimating its chances of winning in
court. In the framework above, this corresponds to the range of the ￿rm￿ s prior
11Note that this framework is agnostic as to whether the court of appeals or the lower
court makes a fairer decision. Here, less reliable courts are costly because they lead to more
ine¢ cient litigation.
12Derivations for these three e⁄ects are not shown here, but are available from the author.
7￿ around the bank￿ s true chances of winning at appeal. Reducing this range
increases both the probability of appeal and expected pro￿ts of lenders.
Finally, the probability of appeal and expected pro￿ts are both a⁄ected by
costs of litigation (c and C). The sign of this e⁄ect is uncertain, and depends
on ￿:
These in￿ uences are further discussed in section 4.3, after empirical results
are presented.
3 Background and data
3.1 Institutional background
Economic disputes between ￿rms, individual entrepreneurs and the state fall
under the jurisdiction of Russian arbitrazh courts. These are professional courts
organized in a three-tier structure: courts of ￿rst instance (regional courts),
appellate courts (okrug courts), and the Supreme Arbitration Court.
Regional courts were created in 1991 in 81 of Russia￿ s 89 administrative
regions. They replaced the Soviet system of arbitration tribunals which had
dealt with con￿ icts between state-owned enterprises under central planning.
Although the old name was kept, the new system was set up quite di⁄erently
from the Soviet one13.
The jurisdiction of each regional arbitrazh court coincides with the admin-
istrative borders of the region14. The plainti⁄ is required to ￿le his suit in the
arbitrazh court of the region where the defendant is o¢ cially registered, pre-
venting ￿ venue shopping￿ . Therefore, if a ￿rm defaults on a loan, the lender will
be suing it in the commercial court of the region where the ￿rm is registered.
This implies that lending to ￿rms should be a⁄ected by the quality of the court
where these ￿rms are registered, rather than the court in the region where the
lender is registered.
Litigants unhappy with a decision of the regional court can appeal it to
a corresponding okrug court of appeals, of which there are ten it total15;16.
These courts were established in 1995. The jurisdiction of each appellate court
includes from 7 to 11 regional arbitrazh courts17. In contrast with regional
courts, all cases ￿led with courts of appeal are tried by at least three judges.
There are no restrictions on the types of cases that can be appealed.
Litigants can appeal decisions of okrug courts further to the Supreme Ar-
bitration Court of Russia. Yet, it selects and reviews only a small fraction of
suits ￿led with it.
In an e⁄ort to isolate arbitrazh courts from the in￿ uence of regional and local
authorities, arbitrazh court system is o¢ cially ￿nanced solely from the federal
13See, for instance, Hendley (1998).
14The exceptions are eight regions which do not have an ￿ own￿court.
15An ￿ okrug￿is a large geographical division in Russia which includes several regions.
16Before a decision of a regional court comes into force, a litigant who is unsatis￿ed with it
can also request a re-consideration by a three judge panel of the same regional court.
17The exception is Moscow okrug court which only covers two regional courts.
8budget. Once a judge has been appointed to an arbitrazh court, he has tenure
until he retires. The salary of a judge cannot be reduced throughout his career.
Although initial appointment procedures for arbitrazh judges di⁄er across re-
gional courts and between regional and okrug courts, most of the time the ￿nal
selection is done by a federal o¢ ce from a shortlist of candidates compiled by
a committee of judges. Deciding which judges get promoted is the prerogative
of the presidential o¢ ce, again after a committee of judges had short-listed the
candidates.
Litigation fees are set by a federal law, the same for all courts of each tier.
In Russia, between 1995 and 2001, 63% of all cases resolved by regional
commercial courts were disputes between enterprises, including banks. The vast
majority of these were breach of contract suits. In the same period, litigants
took roughly 5% of all regional court decisions to appellate courts18.
3.2 Data
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this
study. The data on annual activity of each regional commercial court is has
been obtained from the Supreme Arbitration Court of Russia. The ￿rm level
data on credits and loans received were taken from the Alba/Gnozis collection
of accounting reports of medium and large size Russian enterprises19. Regional
characteristics, used as control variables, were taken from annual publications
of Goskomstat (the state statistical committee) and the Ministry of Finance.
External credit is observed for each of approximately 20,000, medium and
large size enterprises every year between 1995 and 200220. The sample accounts
for approximately 1% all registered ￿rms in Russia, and about 16% of total
employment. Just under half of all ￿rms are industrial ￿rms, and about a
third are providers of services. Construction ￿rms make up 11% of the sample,
transport ￿rms ￿8%, and agricultural ￿rms ￿3%. Outlier ￿rms with credit to
assets ratio in the top 1/2% of the distribution in any of the years were removed
from the sample.
Trade credit is the single most important source of lending received by
Russian ￿rms: across the eight sampled years, it accounts, on average, for 51%
of the stock of debt held by them (or 23% of ￿rms￿total assets). As in other
countries, it is also the most common one: 97% of ￿rms receive at least some
trade credit from their suppliers.
In contrast, just 41% of ￿rms report having bank credit. Among ￿rms that
do receive bank loans, they accounts for 19% of all external debts (or 10% of
assets), and represent the second most important source of credit after that
from suppliers.
Between 1995 and 1998, the sample average of bank credit to assets fell,
hitting the low of 5% in the year of Russia￿ s banking crisis. It then saw a
18See The Supreme Arbitration Court (2002).
19A more detailed description of these data can be found, for example, in Bessonova et al
(2003).
20This is an unbalanced panel.
9gradual recovery in post-crisis years to 10% in 2002. This pattern is consistent
with the aggregate ￿gures published by the Central Bank of Russia.
This trend masks two opposing e⁄ects: continuous expansion of bank credit
by ￿rms that have access to it counteracted by a fall in the number of such
￿rms. Evolution of the share of ￿rms with bank credit varies signi￿cantly from
region to region, and some examples are shown in ￿gure 4. In some regions,
this ￿rst fell, and then rose again over time. Steady declines were observed, for
example, in Chukotsky region and Dagestan.
The court data covers 81 regional arbitrazh courts over the same period
of eight years, 1995-2002. The rate of appeals was calculated by dividing the
number of regional court decisions appealed by the number of all cases completed
in the same court in the same year21. As shown in table 1, the mean rate of
appeal in the sample is 5%22. Average rates for individual courts vary from 3%
(Bashkortostan) to 11% (Moscow city)23.
4 Empirical method and results
The econometric analysis is based on a panel data model of the form
yirt = f(￿(1 ￿ ￿rt) + ￿xirt + uirt); (9)
where y is the credit of ￿rm i located in region r at time t; and ￿rt is the rate
of appeals in regional commercial court r and time t: Thus, 1 ￿ ￿rt captures
reliability of the regional court. Other exogenous variables are denoted by xitr.
If more reliable courts have a positive e⁄ect on lending, ￿ should be positive
and signi￿cant.
Three issues arise when estimating and interpreting the parameters of this
model. First, many ￿rms in the sample have no bank credit. Since bank
credit cannot be negative, the appropriate model for describing its behaviour
is yirt = max(0;￿(1 ￿ ￿rt) + ￿xirt + uirt): Thus, a linear estimation of the
relationship between yirt and 1 ￿ ￿rt would produce inconsistent coe¢ cients.
Therefore, I estimate a non-linear tobit model in subsection 4.1.
The second concern is the nature of unobserved elements (uirt) in equa-
tion (9). When the error term includes ￿rm or region speci￿c characteristics,
these are common to several observations, and residuals for these observations
will be correlated. This requires standard errors of estimators to be adjusted
accordingly.
Third, if we believe these unobserved characteristics (uirt) to be correlated
with the law enforcement variable 1 ￿ ￿rt, estimators that ignore this correla-
tion will be inconsistent. Unfortunately, non-linear estimation procedures have
21An alternative de￿nition, where the number of cases appealed was divided by all cases
completed in the previous year, was also tested: this does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the conclu-
sions.
22For comparison, in the US, the rate of appeal of district court decisions was 13.5% in
2000. This includes all civil cases, not only commercial disputes.
23Variation in (perceived) e⁄ectiveness of courts is also found by Frye and Zhuravskaya
(2000) who survey of small shops in three Russian cities.
10signi￿cant limitations in dealing with such omitted variables. In section 4.2, I
argue that my results using tobit model indicate that a discrete choice model
may capture well the main e⁄ect of law enforcement on credit here. I, therefore,
use discrete choice models for robustness checks in section 4.2.
Throughout this empirical section, I try to be explicit about the assumptions
I make on uirt. I start with most innocuous ones in subsection 4.1; and then
relax them in the robustness discussion in 4.2.
Finally, subsection 4.3 focuses on further interpretation of obtained results.
It comes back to the issue that the rate of appeals might proxy for variables
other than reliability of courts, raised earlier in the paper.
4.1 Basic results
Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating the e⁄ect of reliability of courts
on credit received by ￿rms using (9).
Column 1 looks at bank credit, measured as a fraction of the ￿rm￿ s total
assets. I ￿nd a highly signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect of court reliability on bank
credit. The model is estimated using tobit, with the marginal e⁄ects given
in columns 1a and 1b. The e⁄ect of court reliability on the size of loans to
￿rms that are receiving them is positive and signi￿cant (column 1a). So is the
e⁄ect of court reliability on the probability that a ￿rms receives a loan (column
1b). The latter is signi￿cantly greater than the former. This suggests that
improvements in law enforcement mostly work through broadening access to
credit for ￿rms who have not been borrowing before, rather than increasing the
size of loans to ￿rms that are already borrowing.
In terms of magnitude, a one percentage point reduction in the rate of ap-
peals increases the probability that a ￿rm receives bank credit by 1.2%. This
suggests, for example, that replacing Chukotsky commercial court (one of the
courts with the highest appeal rates), with that from Vladimirskaya oblast,
should increase the number of ￿rms who receive bank credit by about 8%24.
Turning to trade credit, column 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on reliability
of law enforcement is also positive and signi￿cant. However, it is notably
smaller than the coe¢ cient on bank credit. Since only 4% of observations in
the sample report zero trade credit, the non-linear e⁄ects are likely to be small.
Accordingly, a linear model is estimated in column 3. Its results are consistent
with the tobit model.
Column 4 looks at credit received by enterprises from dependent ￿rms. It is
not a⁄ected by law enforcement. In columns 5 and 6, I test for impact of court
reliability on trade credit extended by the sampled ￿rms to their customers,
and ￿nd no e⁄ect. Since the lender must sue the borrower in the borrower￿ s
region, this is consistent with ￿rms extending credit to customers located in
other regions.
24This is a slight abuse of interpretation, since in a tobit regression the marginal e⁄ect
is not constant with respect to independent variables. In the next section, I show that a
linear estimate of the e⁄ect of court reliability is almost exactly the same in magnitude, and,
therefore, the example above is valid.
11Altogether, these results make sense: The number of ￿rms receiving bank
credit increases when regional courts are more reliable. The loan amounts
also rise but the e⁄ect is smaller. This is consistent with contract enforcement
costs being largely ￿xed. Credit from suppliers is notably less sensitive to court
performance. This is consistent with major theories of trade credit, that suggest
that suppliers have better access to information and monitoring of their clients
than banks25. This result also agrees with Johnson et al (1999) who show that
Eastern European suppliers respond more to perceived court quality when the
customer is new. Finally, lending from ￿rms who are connected to the borrower
through ownership links, and, therefore, largely protected from the borrower￿ s
default, is not a⁄ected by court performance.
4.2 Robustness
The next task is to assess the robustness of these ￿ndings. The tobit model
assumes that the error terms, uirt are independently normally distributed, and
uncorrelated with the law enforcement variable. However, because the empirical
model does not account for all ￿rm and regional factors a⁄ecting credit, a more
realistic form of the error term allows for interdependence across observations
i.e.
uirt = ￿r + ￿i + "itr: (10)
Here ￿r captures a region speci￿c e⁄ect common to all ￿rms located in one
region (for example, physical infrastructure), and ￿i captures a ￿rm e⁄ect (for
instance, managerial ability), under the assumption that both of these stay the
same for the sample period.
This has two implications. First of all, the true variance-covariance matrix
of uirt will now have non-zero o⁄-diagonal elements for observations from the
same region and for the same ￿rm. Ignoring these will underestimate the
standard errors of regression coe¢ cients. In my data, this e⁄ect is aggravated
because the law enforcement variable is measured at the level of region, and
does not vary across observations for ￿rms located in the same region for any
given year (see Moulton (1990)).
Secondly, if either ￿r or ￿i are correlated with law enforcement, a model that
does not account for this will produce inconsistent estimates. As discussed in
more detail below, some of regional factors may be correlated with reliability
of court decisions. It is less likely that individual ￿rm characteristics have an
impact on regional rate of appeals at courts. Still, this cannot be ruled out
since the sample includes large ￿rms.
If data generating process were linear, the issue of correlation between ￿r;
￿i and explanatory variables could have been addressed by taking advantage
of panel structure of the data and estimating a ￿ ￿xed e⁄ects￿regression. In a
non-linear framework, introducing regional or ￿rm dummies does not solve the
problem. In tobit type models, this problem is especially di¢ cult to deal with
25See, for instance, Petersen and Rajan (1997).
12when the common factors are unobservable26.
My ￿ndings so far suggest that the dominant e⁄ect of better court per-
formance is on the probability of a ￿rm receiving a loan. Focusing on this,
I rede￿ne the dependent variable as a binary (discrete choice) indicator which
equals to 1 if the ￿rm has a loan, and 0 otherwise. Table 3 estimates a logit (col-
umn 1) and a linear probability (column 2) models using this binary outcome.
The results con￿rm the highly signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of court reliability on
bank lending found in the tobit model. The marginal e⁄ect of reducing the rate
of appeal on the probability of receiving a bank loan is 1.1%, which is almost
the same as that obtained from the tobit model.
Shifting the focus to the probability of getting a loan allows me to tackle the
problem of ￿xed unobserved e⁄ects. Column 2 demonstrates that the estimates
remain robust when all ￿xed regional level e⁄ects are controlled for by dummies
in a linear model. To address a further issue of unobserved ￿rm level e⁄ects, a
￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects model is estimated using conditional logit (column 3) and linear
probability (column 4). The coe¢ cient on court reliability remains positive and
signi￿cant at 1% level. However, the magnitude of the marginal e⁄ect reported
in the linear regression is now 0.4%, signi￿cantly below the 1.1% obtained earlier.
It so happens that no ￿rms in the sample moved from one region to another:
this implies that allowing for ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects also controls for regional level
e⁄ects. When unobserved e⁄ects are given by (10), the error term reduces to
"itr after inclusion of ￿rm level dummies: This means that the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects
model in column 4 provides correct estimates of standard errors.
This is no longer the case if instead we posit that unobserved regional factors
vary over time. Then the error term becomes
uirt = ￿rt + ￿i + "itr: (11)
Now, even when ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for, the residuals of observations
for ￿rms located in the same region in the same year are correlated. The
standard errors of ￿xed e⁄ects coe¢ cients will be understated, aggravated since
law enforcement does not vary across ￿rms. Furthermore, if elements of ￿rt
are correlated with the law enforcement variable, ￿xed e⁄ects estimates may be
inconsistent27.
Estimations reported in table 4 address these issues. I control for some
omitted factors whose over time changes may be a⁄ecting both court reliability
and bank credit.
So far, dynamic regional factors, such as the level of regional development
and regional government policies, have not been included. Yet, there are no
obvious channels through which such factors could in￿ uence court reliability: re-
26If the factors a⁄ecting credit and law enforcement were all observable, a two stage proce-
dure proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) could be followed to obtain consistent estimates
for law enforcement coe¢ cients. For more on estimation of tobit models with unobservable
e⁄ects see Honore and Kyriazidou (2000).
27Similarly, ￿xed e⁄ects may not lead to consistency if "itr and law enforcement are corre-
lated.
13gional commercial courts are ￿nanced and organized by the federal government,
who appoints judges taken from the national pool of candidates.
Using the same logic, court quality is likely to be correlated with assistance
from the federal centre to a particular region. Such assistance may also a⁄ect
lending to ￿rms in its own right. I control for federal support using three mea-
sures of government subsidies: ￿rst, direct subsidies from the federal government
to the regional government; second, subsidies to individual ￿rms, and third, the
amount individual ￿rms owe in tax arrears28. In addition, I control for changes
in regional infrastructure over time by including the fraction of the population
with access to telephones. Finally, I include court case load per judge to control
for the possibility that increases in regional economic activity raise both bank
credit and the number of law suits, a⁄ecting court performance. Results in
column 1 show that inclusion of these controls does not a⁄ect the estimated
impact of court reliability on access to credit.
I now introduce controls for changes in ￿rm level factors. Current assets
proxy for the ￿rm￿ s demand for short term ￿nancing. The fraction of ￿nished
goods in inventory measures the ease with which creditors can liquidate short
term assets in case of a default. Column 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on court
reliability remains positive and signi￿cant when these controls are included.
Both controls are signi￿cant and have expected positive signs.
The regression shown in column 3 addresses contemporaneous correlation of
residuals potentially caused by omitting time varying regional factors. Standard
errors of coe¢ cients in column 3 are adjusted for this using a procedure outlined
in Rogers (1993), and usually referred to as ￿ clustering.￿ Although the standard
error of the estimated impact of court reliability has now risen, the e⁄ect is still
positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level.
I now perform the most stringent robustness test by adding region speci￿c
time trends to control for changes in omitted variables over time. The e⁄ect
of court reliability can no longer be identi￿ed. This is not entirely surprising:
inclusion of regional time trends reduces the variation from which the e⁄ect of
law enforcement is identi￿ed to deviations from the regional trend.
Coming back to the size of bank loans that ￿rms receive, the e⁄ect of courts
on it does not seem to disappear when region speci￿c trends are used. The
estimation in column 5 uses bank credit to assets ratio as a dependent variable
in a linear model. In column 6, the same equation is estimated only for ob-
servations where bank credit is positive. Despite inclusion of region speci￿c
trends, the e⁄ect of court reliability is positive and signi￿cant. However, these
estimation must be viewed with caution, since bank credit data is, by nature,
non-linear.
Finally, table 5 revisits the relationship between predictability of the court
system and credit from sources other than banks, now using a ￿rm ￿xed ef-
fects speci￿cation. The e⁄ect of courts on trade credit received can no longer
be identi￿ed. The impact of court reliability on credit from ￿rms connected
through ownership has a negative sign. This suggests that as courts￿perfor-
28Subsidies to ￿rms and tax debts may also include those from/due to regional governments.
14mance improves, ￿rms switch from internal to external sources of funding.
To summarize, the positive e⁄ect of court reliability on the proportion of
￿rms receiving bank credit is robust to controlling for regional and ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects. This e⁄ect remains highly signi￿cant also when a number of important
regional level and ￿rm level controls are included. It is robust to adjustment
of the standard errors for intra-￿rm and contemporaneous intra-regional corre-
lation. However, the e⁄ect of law enforcement on access to bank credit can no
longer be identi￿ed when region speci￿c time trends are included.
4.3 The rate of appeals as a proxy for other things29
A remaining concern is that one minus the rate of appeals might proxy for
something other than reliability of the lower court￿ s decisions. Section 2 showed
that court reliability j￿￿1=2j directly a⁄ects the rate of appeals ￿ and through
it, bank￿ s pro￿ts30. However, it is also in￿ uenced by three other factors: ￿rst,
average amount at stake; second, the parties￿ability to assess legality of their
claim; and third, costs of litigation. Since my regressions do not control for
these explicitly, I shall now consider how the interpretation of my results may
be a⁄ected by omission of these three variables.
First, the average amount at stake is likely to be positively correlated with
the size of credit received by ￿rms. This may a⁄ect interpretation of estima-
tions with size of loan as a dependent variable. From the model in section 2, the
stake￿ s impact on the rate of appeals is ambiguous. If it is negative, omission
of the average amount at stake will underestimate the e⁄ect of court reliability
on size of bank loans, and vice versa. Yet, omission of the stake variable should
not in￿ uence estimations where the probability of getting a loan is used as a
dependent variable, since there is no obvious correlation between such proba-
bility and dispute stake. Thus, the interpretation of my ￿nding that higher
court reliability increases the number of ￿rms that get bank credit should not
be a⁄ected.
Second, when the ￿rm￿ s ability to anticipate the decisions of appellate court
improves (range of ￿ shrinks), this reduces the expected bank￿ s costs of enforc-
ing loan contracts: At the same time, it also increases the rate of appeals31.
Therefore, omitting the degree of sophistication of litigating parties from re-
gressions biases the coe¢ cient on court performance downwards. This implies
that my results underestimate the true e⁄ect of court performance on external
￿nance.
Third, the costs of litigation can be broken down into court fees, and other
￿rm speci￿c costs (such as lawyer fees, reputation e⁄ects etc.). The former
29In this section, I rely on several e⁄ects derived from the model in section 2 which are not
shown here explicitly, but are available on request.
30At extremes, when ￿ = 1=2; ￿ = 1; when ￿ = 1, ￿ = 0; and when ￿ = 0, ￿ = 1.
31This follows from the framework in section 2. As the range of ￿rm￿ s expectations shrinks
around the bank￿ s true chances of winning, the probability that the suit is litigated in the
lower court falls. However, the probability that the suit appealed given that it had been
litigated in the lower court rises.
15do not vary across Russian courts, and their e⁄ects are controlled for by year
dummies. All ￿xed components of ￿rm speci￿c costs and reputation e⁄ects
are controlled for by ￿rm dummies. Yet, if such costs have a dynamic ￿rm
speci￿c component, it is possible that the coe¢ cient on 1 ￿ ￿ picks up some
of their e⁄ect. From section 2, costs of litigation have an ambiguous e⁄ect
on the rate of appeals and the expected total costs of enforcing repayment by
lenders (it depends on ￿). When the costs move these two variables in opposite
directions, my empirical ￿ndings may understate the impact of court consistency
on lending. When these two variables change in the same direction in response
to changes in litigation costs, my results may indeed overstate the e⁄ect of court
performance on external ￿nancing.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the link between law enforcement and credit extended
to ￿rms. Empirical evidence indicates that reliability of commercial court
decisions is an important determinant of lending to ￿rms. I have shown that
improvements in court performance lead to a rise in the number of ￿rms to
which banks issue credit. They also tend to increase the size of loans that
banks extend. In contrast, the impact of court performance on trade credit is
much weaker and less robust.
The study focuses on a particular aspect of court performance: the reliability
of the judicial decisions as predictors of what is lawful. It also identi￿es a
channel through which law enforcement e⁄ect operates: when law enforcement
is more predictable, this encourages early settlement between disputing parties,
helps avoid costly litigation and therefore reduces expected costs of contract
enforcement for banks and other lenders32.
The analysis provides new evidence that the legal environment is important
for ￿nancial and economic development. Furthermore, it shows that the speci￿c
ways in which courts enforce laws have a substantial impact, even when law on
the books remains the same. This suggests, that looking at di⁄erences in
the process of law enforcement and not just laws themselves is important for
understanding why di⁄erent legal systems are associated with di⁄erent patterns
of economic development.
32 In particular, such a mechanism may help explain existing evidence that countries which
spent less time adapting laws borrowed from other legal systems to local circumstances have












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proof of Proposition 1
Here I show that the probability that the lower court decision is appealed, ￿,
falls in court reliability, j￿ ￿ 1=2j:
Recall that ￿ is the probability that the ￿rm￿ s estimate of the bank￿ s chances
to win the appeal is above ￿
￿; given that it is below 1￿2(c+C)=L (the condition
for litigation in the lower court). Thus, ￿ = ￿min[￿
￿=(1 ￿ 2(C + c)=L);1] +
(1 ￿ ￿):
Let us ￿rst consider the case when ￿ > 1=2: For ￿ to fall in j￿￿1=2j in this



























L )(1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿]2 < 0: (13)
Thus, @￿
@￿ < 0: When ￿ < 1=2, converse is true. QED
18Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2
I need to show that the bank￿ s expected pro￿ts increase in court consistency
j￿ ￿ 1=2j. First consider the case when ￿ > 1=2: The ￿rst derivative of ￿ with







= d ￿fL ￿ C + (￿@￿
@￿)￿[(￿ ￿ ￿ 1)L + 2C] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿@￿ ￿
@￿Lg > 0
if ￿
￿ < 1 ￿ 2(c + C)=L
= 0 if ￿
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 2(c + C)=L
(14)
where ￿ ￿ = E(￿ j ￿
￿ < ￿ < 1 ￿ 2(C + c)=L):
To sign (14), note that d > 0; ￿ > 0; and L￿C > 0: In appendix B, I have
shown that ￿@￿=@￿ > 0: Since ￿[(￿ ￿￿1)L+2C] is the surplus from settlement,
it is positive. Finally, the ￿rm￿ s posterior estimate of the bank￿ s chances to win
the appeal, given that the settlement is achieved also increases with reliability
of the lower court: @￿ ￿
@￿ = [￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 @￿
￿
@￿ ]=(2￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)2 > 0: Thus, @￿=@￿
is positive. Converse is true when ￿ < 1=2: QED.
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Bank credit, % of 
assets given BC>0
Method OLS OLS
Court reliability 0.005** 0.004** 0.004* 0.001 0.0014** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)
Central government's transfers to region 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Government subsidies to firm -0.006 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Owed to government by firm -0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional telephone coverage -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Judicial caseload -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current assets 0.060** 0.053** 0.052** 0.074** 0.16**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
Finished goods in inventory 0.080** 0.085** 0.085** 0.016** 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional dummies N N N N N N
Industry dummies N N N N N N
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region-specific time trends N N N Y Y Y
Standard errors adjusted for 
contemporaneous intra-region correlation
N N Y Y Y Y
N 108,449 96,934 96,934 99,609 100,031 40,534
R
2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.60
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;  
+ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Pseudo R
2 for conditional logit, adjusted R2 for linear regression.
Standard errors in linear regressions have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Table 4  Law enforcement and access to credit: controlling for time-varying factors
Access to bank credit (binary)
Linear probability model 
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